96 points by npmipg 1 day ago | 110 comments | View on ycombinator
petekoomen 1 day ago |
boesboes about 17 hours ago |
andai 1 day ago |
jedwhite 1 day ago |
The post mentioned Pete Koomen's install.md idea as an example use case. So now with this launch you can try it with a real intstallation script!
I think it's a really interesting idea worth experimentation and exploration. So it's a positive thing to see Mintlify launch this, and that it's already on Firecrawl.dev's docs!
We can all learn from it.
Show HN discussion of executable markdown here:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46549444
The claude-run tool lets you execute files like this autonomously if you want to experiment with it.
curl -fsSL https://docs.firecrawl.dev/install.md | claude-run --permission-mode bypassPermissions
Github repo:https://github.com/andisearch/claude-switcher
This is still a very early-stage idea, but I'm really stoked to see this today. For anyone interested in experimenting with it, it's a good idea to try in a sandboxed environment.
dddrh about 21 hours ago |
I like the notion of having install.md be the thing that is referenced in Prompt to Install on the web.
Edit: forgot my link https://dontoisme.github.io/ai/developer-tools/ux/2025/12/27...
ollien 1 day ago |
oftenwrong 1 day ago |
bigbuppo 1 day ago |
0o_MrPatrick_o0 1 day ago |
I’m not sure this solution is needed with frontier models.
utopiah about 17 hours ago |
Sorry but what the heck?
We should NOT standardize irresponsible behavior, in particular for repeatable tasks. This is particularly maddening when solutions like dependency resolution, containers, distribution of self-contained and binaries DO exist.
I understand that the hype machine must feed on yet another idea to keep its momentum but this is just ridiculous.
JoshPurtell 1 day ago |
Once you accept that installation will be automated, standardized formats make a lot of sense. Big q is will this particular format, which seems solid, get adopted - probably mostly a timing question
vagab0nd about 11 hours ago |
undefined about 22 hours ago |
rarisma 1 day ago |
Jokes aside, this seems like a really wierd thing to leave to agents; I'm sure its definitely useful but how exactly is this more secure, a bad actor could just prompt inject claude (an issue I'm not sure can ever be fixed with our current model of LLMs).
And surely this is significantly slower than a script, claude can take 10-20 seconds to check the node version; if not longer with human approval for each command, a script could do that in miliseconds.
Sure it could help it work on more environments, but stuff is pretty well standardised and we have containers.
I think this part in the FAQ wraps it up neatly:
""" What about security? Isn't this just curl | bash with extra steps? This is a fair concern. A few things make install.md different:
Human-readable by design. Users can review the instructions before execution. Unlike obfuscated scripts, the intent is clear.
Step-by-step approval. LLMs in agentic contexts can be configured to request approval before running commands. Users see each action and can reject it.
No hidden behavior. install.md describes outcomes in natural language. Malicious intent is harder to hide than in a shell script.
Install.md doesn't eliminate trust requirements. Users should only use install.md files from sources they trust—same as any installation method.
"""So it is just curl with extra steps; scripts aren't obfuscated, you can read them; if they are obfuscated then they aren't going to use a Install.md and you (the user) should really think thrice before installing.
Step by step approval also sorta betrays the inital bit about leaving installing stuff to ai and wasting time reading instructions.
Malicious intent is harder to hide, but really if you have any doubt in your mind about an authors potential malefeasance you shouldn't be running it, wrapping claude around this doesn't make it any safer really when possible exploits and malware are likely baked into the software you are trying to install, not the install.
tldr; why not just have @grok is this script safe?
Ten more glorious years to installer.sh
creatonez about 4 hours ago |
arianvanp 1 day ago |
pshirshov about 13 hours ago |
pancsta about 12 hours ago |
imiric 1 day ago |
That way we can have entire projects with nothing but Markdown files. And we can run apps with just `claude run app.md`. Who needs silly code anyway?
_pdp_ about 15 hours ago |
llms.txt makes sense as a standard but this is unnecessary.
dang about 22 hours ago |
Since the article has been changed to tone down its provocative opener, which clearly had a kicking-the-anthill effect, I'm moving those original reactions to this subthread.
On the other hand, an equivalent install.md file might read something like this:
Install bun for me.
Detect my OS and CPU architecture, then download the appropriate bun binary zip from GitHub releases (oven-sh/bun). Use the baseline build if my CPU doesn't support AVX2. For Linux, use the musl build if I'm on Alpine. If I'm on an Intel Mac running under Rosetta, get the ARM version instead.
Extract the zip to ~/.bun/bin, make the binary executable, and clean up the temp files.
Update my shell config (.zshrc, .bashrc, .bash_profile, or fish http://config.fish depending on my shell) to export BUN_INSTALL=~/.bun and add the bin directory to my PATH. Use the correct syntax for my shell.
Try to install shell completions. Tell me what to run to reload my shell config.
It's much shorter and written in english and as a user I know at a glance what the author is trying to do. In contrast with install.sh, install.md makes it easy for the user to audit the intentions of the programmer.
The obvious rebuttal to this is that if you don't trust the programmer, you shouldn't be installing their software in the first place. That is, of course, true, but I think it misses the point: that coding agents can act as a sort of runtime for prose and as a user the loss in determinism and efficiency that this implies is more than made up for by the gain in transparency.